This is a blog about thinking. I’ve been focused on thinking for many years and my theory about its functioning and structure was published in, “A Theory of the Microdynamics of Occurrent Thought,” by Lexington Books in 2015 . If you’re interested in buying this book click on the following link: (book’s page on our site). The theory may be the only detailed and coherent account of the structure and functioning of thoughts presented in any literature thus far. Because the theory is apparently so new to academia, the book presentation is very detailed, complex, and technical. Furthermore, each element of the theory presented in the book was supported by research and many complex issues relative to it had to be addressed. This blog is an attempt to make an understanding of the functioning and structure of thoughts more accessible to students in high-school and to undergraduates in college. Lay readers may be interested in learning about thoughts in a less tedious and technical fashion, as well.
It’s important to add, however, that even though I’m attempting to make this work more accessible to a wider range of people, the present subject matter is quite “dense,” meaning that it’s not easy to understand via a simple reading. Like so much that students read in text books, it takes some study, note taking, and contemplation of the subject matter to really “get it.” The material here is simple at first, but becomes increasingly complicated as one thing builds upon another.
The title of this blog, “The Nature of Thinking,” is a bit presumptuous in that the theory being offered here is just that, a theory, the elements of which have not yet been examined, validated, or invalidated by any scholars in the fields of philosophy, psychology, cognitive psychology/science, and so on. Because it is the only coherently outlined theory of thinking of which I’m aware, I offer it as a tentatively accurate one. I hope that the theory presented in the book might one day be reviewed by relevant experts in their respective fields so that it may be wholly or partially validated (or not). Until other theories come to the fore, this is the only one that we appear to have at the moment.
Given the theory’s apparent, lone status at the present time, I am still shocked that this should be the case at all, given the fact that thinking is one of the most unique, powerful, and defining aspects of what it is like to be a modern human and given that philosophers have been addressing its import for thousands of years. I think it’s equally amazing that any student or reader of this blog could be the first ever to describe the hypothesized structure and functioning of thoughts to their high-school or college class, to write a paper about the topic, or to talk about it among other potentially interested parties.
The present theory is a completely new way of understanding human thinking. I believe that the descriptive and detailed outline of the subjective nature of thinking presented in the theory is fundamentally important because thoughts are so prominent, influential, self-defining, and so on. Thinking is so intrinsically part of what it’s like to be a modern human that the theory may one day become a new chapter in “Introduction to Psychology” textbooks. I only make this point to exemplify my belief in the import of thinking and in the significance of detailing its hypothesized, subjective structure and functioning.
In contrast to the apparent lack of coherent theories about the components of thoughts, about how thoughts progress, interconnect, and how a working self grounded in immediacy traverses its phases, eastern religious traditions have a great deal to say about thoughts. Nevertheless, I’m not aware of a coherent presentation about them per se. The theory presented in “A Theory of the Microdynamics of Occurrent Thought” touches on some support gleaned by eastern religious traditions, ones that I very much respect. In addition, ancient and contemporary philosophers have had a lot to say about thoughts in relation to their discussions of “intentional states” or in relation to other subjects which are their primary focus.
Briefly, an intentional state is a mental act that focuses its attention on an object and that confers meaning on it. In addition, an intentional state possesses consciousness of that object. Therefore, when one perceives an object, makes a judgement about it, has a cognitive reaction to it, makes an evaluation of it, and so on, one is engaged in an intentional act. Edmund Husserl, the father of phenomenology, discusses intentional acts in some of his early writings (Husserl, 1970).
Thoughts are a subset of the more general category of intentional acts. All thoughts are intentional acts because they attend to given objects and confer meaning upon them. Philosophers have given much attention to the structure and functioning of intentional acts but much less so to thoughts per se. Nevertheless, the theory of thinking offered here appears to be consistent with what philosophers have generally agreed is true about intentional acts.
It might seem to the reader that there’s not much to say about thinking that isn’t already obvious. In this vein, it has been a shock to me that over much of my lifetime I have been exposed to very little about its specific elements. Even finding an adequate definition of thinking has been a challenge. In truth, and as you will soon see, there is a great deal to say about it, much of which has never been offered before.
An important realization that I’ve had in recent years is that, due to the advent and dominance of computers and computer science over the past sixty plus years, a subjective accounting of the import of thinking has taken a back seat to the consensus among computer scientists that thinking in humans is much like that of the “thinking” that takes place in computers. These scientists believe that our thoughts are generated on unconscious levels in the brain and that by the time we become aware of them as sentences in our minds’, their cognitive and behavioral impact has already been determined. In other words, the sentences of our thoughts are not viewed as playing any determining role in cognition and behavior, and instead, are seen as an after effect, so to speak (referred to as an epiphenomenon); like the steam rising from water that is boiling. In other words, the water is already boiling and will serve its function, but the steam is irrelevant.
For most of us, this idea that the cognitive impact of thoughts is determined before they take the form of the sentences of our language “in our minds” seems to defy common-sense and our subjective experience, but to philosophers of mind, cognitive psychologists, cognitive scientists, and the like, it is a highly agreed upon notion. These experts are said to support communication theories of thought and language. These communication theorists adhere to the notion that manifest thoughts simply serve to communicate the ideas and intentions that the brain has already worked out and processed. Please review Pylyshyn (1986) and Fodor (1975) for more information about communication conception theories. This relative consensus among so many scholars may account for why so little has been said in any academic literature about the subjective nature of thinking, and therefore, about why no coherent and detailed theories about it have appeared in such writings. It still shocks me that, after thousands of years of philosophical writings and after more than one hundred years since the inception of the science of psychology, so little has been said about the nature of human thought.
In contrast to communication theories of thought and language, I am an advocate of cognitive conception theories that espouse the belief, called the “weak” view, the thoughts which we entertain in our minds play at least some determining role in cognition and behavior. See Carruthers (1996; 2005) for more information about cognitive conception theories. More specifically, I argue that the complexities of thinking that are occurring on the subjectively accessible plane of experience serve the purpose of playing some determinate role in cognition.
It’s important to give names to the different parts of thought in order to indicate and describe their significance and function. The names help us single out the parts of thought in order to designate and describe them. In identifying the “parts” of thought I utilize names that I will capitalize throughout the text, in large part, because those names consist of descriptive terms that may create some confusion to the reader as he or she reads the text. Capitalizing these names clarifies the text, in my opinion. In addition, there are other important concepts to define before beginning to talk more specifically about thoughts.
One concept that plays an extremely important role in human experience is that of the operating I. Historically, human experience is often referred to as a stream because it seems like objects and events continuously flow into and through us like water in a stream. Interestingly, there is an aspect of human experience that seems to receive the seemingly constant flow of objects and events, as if he/she were swimming upstream, fighting the current while watching leaves, twigs, bubbles, fish, and so on, flow towards and past him/her. This operating I is like a center point in the stream. In fact, Luis Niel (2010) describes it as the “continuous center in the flowing life of my subjectivity.” In addition, the operating I seems to remain the same over time while everything in the stream constantly changes. It is the subject that exists as a point of reference in relation to everything else that appears as an object. It is a sense of subjective presence that is grounded in immediacy. It can also become an object to itself in the form of thoughts, feelings, and so on, but in truth, it is not directly attainable as an object because it inherently exists as the sense of subjective presence that receives all objects. Furthermore, it is viewed as the means through which all objects and events are experienced as mine.
In A Theory of the Microdynamics of Occurrent Thought I also refer to the operating I as the center of receptive-reactive presence. It’s simplest function at the outset of thoughts is to objectify a stimulus and identify it. Its more complicated function is to react to the identity of an object via a narrative, one that typically reflects that object’s significance to the present goals of the self. This center of receptive-reactive presence not only exists and functions during every single thought that we experience, it is also functioning during all of our interactions with given objects, events, and people in the surroundings. There is always this experience of ourselves that lives in the present moment and that is receiving and reacting to objectified and identified stimuli. Moreover, this center of receptive-reactive presence has amazing abilities, which we will discuss in a bit.
The operating I often functions in a extremely fast pace, moving through and out of “images” in our minds; through and out of the various contents of our thoughts; and through and out of our perceptions relative to stimuli in the surroundings. In this sense, it is very much like a humming bird that speedily flits and darts in and out of the stamens of flowers, around twigs, and so on. As you’ll discover below, like the humming bird, the operating I has amazing abilities.
Two other important concepts that will help us talk about the subjective nature of the parts of thoughts were outlined by the famous American psychologist, William James (1890/1950). James’ fascinating discussion about thoughts included a discussion about the fact that they seem to be made up of an alteration of “flights” and “perchings.” The perchings, he said, are the resting places in thoughts that consist of images. He called these resting places the substantive parts of thoughts. James said that the flights are the reactions to the substantive images and he referred to these as the transitive parts of thoughts. He added that the transitive parts of thoughts function to lead from one substantive part to the next. Interestingly, James said that we can’t really capture the transitive parts so to discern their true contents and nature. Because they are “flights to a conclusion,” attending to them renders them objects, thereby destroying their inherent transitive forms.
Having defined the operating I and transitive and substantive phases of thinking, we can begin to define the component parts of thoughts. The first part to be addressed is called the “Primary Excerptive Experience,” which is a developing memory. This developing memory is a transitively-based micro experience consisting of an extremely fleeting quasi-perceptual experience of one or two tenths of a second in duration! In “mind space” it consists of quasi-perceptual content (usually visual) that serves as a developing memory. For example, when I was getting ready for work this morning I experienced quasi-visual and quasi-auditory imagery of the weather woman on TV last night saying that it was going to be icy over night. This imagery existed in the form of a micro experience, meaning, it was a transitive phenomenon consisting of an extremely brief temporal duration. In addition, like the water of a stream rushing over my head, my operating I seemed to be submerged in this experiential imagery as it occurred. In other words, it seemed like any sense of subjective presence was absent as I became awash in the experience of this imagery. Because the operating I seems to be completely, albeit fleetingly, immersed in the imagery of Primary Excerptive Experiences (or developing micro experiences), and because they are so fleeting, one is almost never conscious of their existence. In this sense, they are extremely elusive to conscious awareness.
Recently, when someone was talking about the recent death of a loved one, I experienced, “in mind space,” the imagery of my grandmother lying on a bed while dying and of raising her arms in the air while proclaiming that she was in heaven surrounded by flowers. This sequence of imagery was like a snippet from a movie in which my operating I was “immersed,” followed by surfacing from it in order to attend to and objectify it. This snippet may have lasted for one, two, or three tenths of a second and is what I call a Primary Excerptive Experience. Interestingly, I first experienced this imagery when my aunt told me about being with my grandmother during her last living moments. I re-experienced that imagery when someone was talking about their recent loss of a loved one. When my operating I surfaced from its immersion in this Primary Excerptive Experience, while attending to its “tail end,” it seemed to become a fixed image that functioned as a memory.
While watching a basketball game on TV yesterday I became a immersed in quasi-visual imagery of playing a game of “one-on-one” with a guy who thought he was much better than I and of making a series of consecutive shots while bystanders cheered. This transitively-based visual imagery was a Primary Excerptive Experience that was developing and in which my operating I seemed to be immersed and subjectively became (i.e., immersed in and as). My operating I’s surfacing from and attention to this developing experience will fix it in the objectified form of a visual image that will then function as a memory. In other words, Primary Excerptive Experiences are the transitively-based experiential forerunners to a fixed visual image, for example.
It is important to acknowledge that Primary Excerptive Experiences also occur in our relationship to the surroundings. In our normal day-to-day interactions with the environment we are immersed in a wide variety of perceptual experiences, a small percentage of which we become aware in given moments. When the operating I turns to a given perceptual experience, there is an extremely short period of time when it seems immersed in it, followed by a surfacing from and attention to it, resulting in the objectification of certain of its perceptual aspects. I believe that it takes about one or two tenths of a second to objectify any given aspect of a perceptual experience because attention must turn to and become immersed in it before it can be objectified.
The sudden presence of what seems to be a static object that exists only for an instant is called an Excerpt or fixed image. It is an “image” because, as a quasi-perception, it is a representation of a stimulus in the surroundings, and therefore, not the actual stimulus itself. In other words, like a photograph of an object, the photo is not the actual object, but a representation of it. In addition, I refer to it as an image because, like a photographic image, it seems to be briefly fixed in one’s awareness as a seemingly fixed and static visual object.
The term “excerpt” is borrowed from the work of Julian Jaynes (1976) but defined somewhat differently. An excerpt is a often a quasi-visual-image-based memory that is taking a briefly fixed form in one’s awareness. Excerpts can take the form of objectified objects in the surroundings and “in” one’s mind. They also mark the beginning of every thought we experience. They can be evoked by stimuli in the surroundings and “in” the mind.
Now let’s return to the developing Primary Excerptive Experiences that occur “within one’s mind.” Following the apparent immersion of the operating I in a fleeting, quasi-visual-imagery-based and developing micro experience, it seems as if the operating I surfaces from that experience. While surfacing, the operating I seems to focus on that passing imagery fast enough to capture or fix it “in its gaze.” In so doing, it’s as if a snap-shot of it has been taken, engendering the sense of a fixed image in the mind’s eye, so to speak. This Excerpt or fixed image is the second “part” of thought, one that follows the Primary Excerptive Experience, thanks to the work of the operating I. That fixed image is called an excerpt because it like a snap shot of experience. Again, one almost never has any conscious awareness of the existence of Primary Excerptive Experiences and as we shall soon see, one is often not very conscious of Excerpts of them either.
Once an Excerpt of a Primary Excerptive Experience has been established by the operating I, a snap shot of that developing micro experience has seemingly been objectified “in one’s mind,” and one begins to identify its content. This identification is an extremely fast, automatic process. Importantly, however, the identification does not have to be an explicit one, where one’s reaction to the identity of the Excerpt literally embodies an explicit knowing of that image’s content. Instead, the conceptual or word-based reaction to the image often consists of or embodies an implicit knowing of that image’s identity. For instance, my conceptual reaction to the weather woman’s report from the night before consisted of the following: “I’ll use my remote car starter because the car’s probably covered with ice.” This reaction certainly implies that I identified the image of her weather report accurately. This type of reaction I call an Experience of Implicit Knowing, indicating that I was fleetingly and implicitly conscious of the content of the Excerpt as reflected by my conceptual reaction to it. I also refer to this consciousness of the Excerpt or fixed image as “small c consciousness” because one is only conscious of it long enough to implicitly identify its content and will likely be unable to recall the image once the present thought is over. Therefore, with “small c consciousness” the fixed image has only been detected long enough to allow for its implicit identification and a narrative reaction to it.
Interestingly, Experiences of Implicit Knowing are defined by the length of time that the operating I focused on the Excerpt image once it surfaced from and attended to the tail end of the developing Primary Micro Experience. In fact, there is a great deal of research in psychology, cognitive psychology, and cognitive science demonstrating that human beings can identify fleetingly presented pictures in as little as one tenth of a second! (Intraub, 1984; Libet, 2004; Potter, 2004). At this lower limit, the identities of such pictures do not become explicitly conscious to the viewer, but their identities are detected, allowing for one to become implicitly conscious of them. Of note is the fact that, at this lower limit, viewers are typically not even conscious of having viewed a picture, let alone of implicitly identifying it.
During the simplest type of thought, most of its phases occur during the Juncture of Receptivity. The Juncture of Receptivity is an interval of time during which the operating I is surfacing face-down from its brief immersion in a developing Primary Excerptive Experience while directing its attention to it. This is similar to a swimmer performing the butter-fly stroke in which his head is briefly immersed in the water followed by its surfacing, resulting in the water being briefly in his sight. This face-down surfacing from and attention to the tail end of a developing Primary Excerptive Experience results in its objectification, seemingly transforming it into an Excerpt, fixed image, or substantive object. As an object, the operating I is now in a position to recognize or implicitly identify its content.
The implicit identification of the Excerpt (in the “mind’s eye”) seems to co-occur with one’s subjective experience of a slight differentiation between a subject and the sudden presence of the fixed mage as a static object. As soon as the Excerpt is established as a seeming object, the operating I seems to be separating from and is immediately identifying it at the outset of a Experience of Implicit Knowing, the conceptual reaction to it. At the outset of that reaction the Excerpt becomes an Implicitly Identified Excerpt (IIE). By definition, the operating I is conscious of that image’s content (of what it is) and is not Conscious of it (to be defined below). The outset of the Experience of Implicit Knowing consists of an implicit recognition of the identity of the Excerpt and through its remainder, frequently consists of a conceptually-based reaction regarding its significance to the present goals of the self.
When the operating I focuses on the Excerpt for a slightly longer length of time, one’s reaction to it often embodies an explicit identification of its content. Research shows that the duration of time required to explicitly identify a picture is about three tenths of a second (Intraub, 1984; Libet, 2004, Potter, 2012). In other words, one can report the image’s content, proving that he or she is Conscious of its content. As a result of that “big C Consciousness,” viewers often remember having witnessed or experienced identified pictures at this longer duration of attention to them. I call this part of thought, Experiences of Explicit Knowing. Importantly, even though such conceptual reactions reflect a Consciousness of the content of an attended-to-image, Experiences of Explicit Knowing do not have to embody a narrative reaction that represents the explicit identification of the image. Instead, one could attend to a Excerpt for approximately three tenths of a second and have the identical reaction as the one noted above: “I’ll use my remote car starter because the car is probably covered in ice,” while having a Consciousness of its identity, meaning that one could likely report its former presence and identity it if asked. Lastly, I will refer to this explicitly identified image as an Explicitly Identified Excerpt (EIE).
The interval during which the operating I is engaged in a face-down surfacing from its immersion in a dveloping Primary Excerptive Experience, followed by an attention to its tail-end, resulting in the objectification and identification of its quasi visual contents, culminating in a narrative reaction to it, is called the Juncture of Receptive-Reactive Presence. During the Juncture of Receptive-Reactive Presence the operating I’s attention to the Exceprt is about two tenths of a second longer than that which occurs during the Juncture of Receptivity, described above. This slightly longer attention to the fixed image results in an explicit identification of its content, in its Consciousness to the operating I, and in a conceptually-based reaction to it that is more apt to be about the image’s content rather than a reaction to its implicitly identified content. In addition, this slightly prolonged attention to the Excerpt also results in the subjective experience of a more intense experiential differentiation between a subject (the operating I), and its object, the fixed image. The latter might be compared to the cell differentiation that occurs during mitosis, where two cells, once fused, split from each other; similar to the seeming fusion between the operating I and the Primary Excerptive Experience, and to their subsequent differentiation as the operating I seems to surface and separate from that experience while reacting to it.
Let’s outline an example of the subjective differences that might occur between a thought that embodies a Juncture of Receptivity versus one that embodies a Juncture of Receptive-Reactive Presence. My girl-friend is talking about how nice the lawn looks and a visual image of the gas can for the lawn mower that I left by the side of the garage develops in my subjective experience (e.g., a developing Primary Excerptive Experience). My operating I surfaces face-down from and attends to the tail-end of that experience only long enough (e.g., perhaps one tenth of a second) to implicitly identify its content, rendering it an Implicitly Identified Excerpt at the outset of a Juncture of Receptivity. This identification evolves into the following conceptual reaction: “I need to put that inside the garage” (e.g., Experience of Implicit Knowing). In contrast, the Juncture of Receptive-Reactive Presence is defined by the operating I’s face-down surfacing from, attention to, and objectification of the same developing Primary Excerptive Experience. However, the operating I attends to that image (i.e., holds in memory) for a couple of tenths of a second longer than in the first example, rendering it an Explicitly Identified Excerpt, culminating in the narrative reaction, “That gas can is all dented up, I think I’ll go buy a new one” (Experience of Explicit Knowing). In other words, the slightly prolonged attention to the same Fxcerpt appears to result in a different, conceptual reaction, one that is more likely to be about that image rather than a reaction to it.
The outsets of Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing are marked by the identification of objectified Primary Excerptive Experiences, and through their remainders, are typically narratively-based, associative responses that rise into one’s subjective experience as a function of the context and goals at hand. Some stimulus, such as seeing my checkbook on the kitchen table, can trigger a narrative reaction somehow associated with it (e.g., “I need to pay the gas bill today”). Such associative and narrative reactions happen all of the time and they tend to represent what we know about given objects, people, situations, and so on. They also tend to reflect the personal significance of certain attended to stimuli in relation to the present goals of the self.
Let’s consider the Junctures of Receptivity and Receptive-Reactive Presence a bit more because there is something amazing happening in one’s subjective experience at their outset. As the operating I surfaces face-down from and attends to a passing Primary Excerptive Experience, that content of that experience is identified at the outset of an Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing. As either reaction ensues, the operating I continues to focus on that object (holding onto a memory trace of it). In other words, one is, in the “form” of the operating I, looking towards while seemingly moving away from that object. It almost seems as if one is moving towards and away from that object simultaneously! The forward thrust of attention towards an object seems to result in the backwards force of a reaction to it. The seeming simultaneity is responsible for the creative instant, one where a reaction is given to you, whether it embodies a mundane, ordinary meaning or one of revelatory significance. Given the latter, it would appear that all creative instances require attention to an object.
Regarding the Junctures of Receptivity and Reactive-Receptive Presence, it’s as if the operating I is briefly holding onto a memory trace of the past (i.e., the passing Primary Excerptive Experience) while reacting to it via conceptual and quasi-perceptual forms that embody experiential realities which are building towards new, future, associatively-based micro experiential reactions. In other words, narrative reactions to Excerpts consist of words that serve as nouns, verbs, and so on, which evoke faint images relative to their meanings. These faint images and words build situational contexts that evoke new, relevant associations. Therefore, the operating I’s focus on an objectified, subjective reality that has passed and is past (e.g., Primary Excerptive Experience) generates presently occurring, quasi-perceptual reactions associated with its words to evoke new micro experiences in the stream of thought.
It is extremely interesting to note that Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing can take the form of clearly articulated narrative responses, or ones that are vaguely articulated, completed, foreshortened, slower, faster, overtly stated, and covertly stated. They tend to express themselves along a range of vague to clearer articulation. In general, overtly expressed ones tend to be more clearly articulated than covert ones because the social norms of speaking and conversation require clearness. In addition, covertly expressed Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing tend to be faster because their complete articulation is less necessary. Furthermore, covertly expressed ones that are vaguely articulated tend to be less manifest in one’s subjective experience. Their vague manifestation tends to be fleeting and ephemeral and their impact on behavior is therefore less likely.
As stated above, Experiences of Implicit Knowing are generally less clearly articulated and are therefore more fleeting than Experiences of Explicit Knowing. In addition, I believe that during Experiences of Implicit Knowing the operating I tends to be less fully immersed in their progression. Instead, it is as if the operating I is slightly immersed in them as if skimming their “surface.” This process might be compared to skimming sentences in a book as one tries to read fast. Therefore, I am proposing that there exists a continuum of how fully the operating I is immersed in Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing.
Given the apparent variety that the narratives of Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing take, and the differences in “depth” in which the operating I is immersed in their progression, I propose that the operating I becomes increasingly skilled in traversing or skimming over them in very rapid speeds. Therefore, the operating I becomes extremely adept in thinking in a fast, foreshortened fashion. I believe that a given foreshortened and vaguely articulated Experience of Implicit Knowing may occur in as little as one or two tenths of a second!
Another important aspect of the progression of Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing concern the apparent fact that at their outset, attention is focused on given Excerpts, resulting in their identification. As the narrative of each reaction ensues, attention is maintained on the identified image, but through the reaction’s tail-end, it turns away from the excerpt-object and becomes much more transitively immersed in its quasi-perceptual, experiential progression.
The basis of all thoughts is the interplay between Primary Excerptive Experiences, Excerpts, and Experiences of Implicit or Explicit knowing. Interestingly, most of us are never Conscious of the contents of developing Primary Excerptive Experiences, are intermittently Conscious of the contents of Excerpts, and are intermittently Conscious of the contents of Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing. However, most of us are never Conscious of the very presence of developing Primary Excerptive Experiences and Excerpts. On the other hand, in adolescence and adulthood, we tend to become more frequently Conscious of the presence of Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing in terms of having an awareness of the existence of their passing narrative contents. Given the latter, for many of us, following the passing of any given Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing, each of which was preceded by a the face-down surfacing of the operating I from a developing Primary Excerptive Experience and the objectification/identification of an Excerpt, we would not likely be able to report the content of any one of these phases of thought, let alone their experiential existence. Nevertheless, these micro phases are the heart of all thoughts because they form one meaning-laden entity based on the fact that they occur so closely together in time and are very related in terms of thematic content. In other words, the meaning reflected in the identification of an objectified Excerpt of a passing Primary Excerptive Experience is embodied in an Experience of Implicit or Explicit knowing, the latter of which consists of a narrative reaction that may contain the significance of the content/identity of the Excerpt-image relative to the present goals of the self.
Let’s take an example. On a recent Monday at work I was going up stairs to the cafeteria to buy lunch when I became immersed in a developing Primary Excerptive Experience of being in the cafeteria last Friday talking to the chef, Tony, who reminded me that the coming Monday was Presidents Day and that the cafeteria would be closed. Upon a face-down surfacing from and attention to that Primary Excerptive Experience it became a fixed, substantive image or object (Excerpt) that I quickly and implicitly identified and responded to at the outset of an Experience of Implicit Knowing: “I’ll go home to have lunch with my girl-friend.” Therefore, in this example, the Experience of Implicit Knowing initially consisted of an implicit identification of the content of the objectified Excerpt-image of the Primary Excerptive Experience, along with a sense of sudden realization that the cafeteria would be closed today, followed by a narrative reaction of my new plan of going home for lunch. This Experience of Implicit Knowing is a very fast, transitively-based, reactive experience in which my operating I is immersed. Nevertheless, it has the power to immediately influence my behavior in guiding me home.
Again, it is important to remember that the narratives of Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing are associatively-based, automatic responses that are given to you, without effort or deliberation. Some may reflect insights of the most profound, others may embody important realizations, and some may simply contain the implicit or explicit identity of an Excerpt-image. Such narratives often reflect some of what we know about given objects, events, people, etc., and often embody plans relative to the significance of identified Excerps.
Now we are in a position to define the first and simplest category of thought referred to as Primary Thought. Primary Thoughts consist of Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing that take as their objects Implicitly or Explicitly Identified Fixed Excerpt-images, respectively. These thoughts take into account the identity of their objects and potentially, the personal significance of those objects to the present goals of the self. Both of the examples in the last paragraph are Primary Thoughts.
Now that we have defined Primary Thoughts, it can be helpful to consider the progression of the parts of thoughts by imagining a visual depiction of them. The progression of the parts of thought can be compared to a card board roll that is shaped like a tube. If you visualize a roll in front of you, or if you draw one on paper, the left, open end of it can stand for the Excerpt-image of a passing, Primary Excerptive Experience that has been objectified by the operating I’s face-down surfacing from and attention to the tail end of it. The operating I then identifies and reacts to that Excerpt via an Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing, represented by the card board roll itself. In other words, the card board that defines the shape of the roll can be compared to the conceptual narrative unfolding in relation to its object, as if the narrative wraps around or constrains one’s awareness as it responds to its identified object. Just like the card board that constrains the inner air inside the roll, the Experience Implicit or Explicit Knowing and the quasi-perceptual, experiential forms/associations co-occurring with either one, constrain experience or awareness. In other words, in the midst of any given thought, the operating I is focused on its identified object while simultaneously being swept up in a narrative reaction to it. Therefore, the meaning-laden object and the meaningful narrative reaction to it constrain and determine the experiencing of the operating I so that it is aware of and experiences nothing else during that reaction.
Above, we discussed the fact that the operating I is grounded in the subjective present. Utilizing the aforementioned visual depiction, we can also imagine a geometric plane, one thin edge of which is facing the viewer so that its flat surface is parallel to the left side opening of the card board roll. We can refer to this plane as “the plane of the subjective present,” which is “where” the operating I functions. Now imagine that you can grab the right side of the roll and slowly push it to the left, through that plane. As the open left end of the roll moves into the plane, an Excerpt-image is given a subjective “life” or presence in one’s phenomenal experience based on the operating I’s face-down surfacing from and attention to a passing Primary Excerptive Experience. As we push the roll further, the operating I receives the identity of the Excerpt-image as it continues to look towards and “move away” from it (at the outset of an Experience of Implicit Knowing). Pushing the roll further, a narrative response to the identified Excerpt begins and the operating I becomes increasingly immersed in the subjective experience of it. Pushing the rest of the roll through, the operating I transitions out the right side “hole” of the narrative reaction in a face-up fashion (to be discussed below), one which will potentially evoke a new, developing Primary Excerptive Experience.
Like the card board roll that confines the space within, the component phases of thoughts confine awareness to its immersion in the meaning-laden, quasi-perceptual contents of thought through their completion. In a sense, its as if thoughts, as defined here by their component “parts,” hijack awareness or experience, swelling it with its contents, often without any awareness that this is happening, thought after thought after thought. Furthermore, awareness is being hijacked by the mini-time machines that thoughts are, ones that seem to carry it into the past and others, the future.
The Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing of Primary Thoughts end in different ways that are called Transitions of Attention. Each such Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing may simply dissipate as one comes to an end while attention moves to a new object. Similarly, the operating I may surface from, attend to, and objectify the passing content of an Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing and then become distracted by a new stimulus. In addition, the operating I may surface face-down from while keeping in mind the content of the passing Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing while transitioning into the next thought or behavior that is somehow consistent with its content because that content was “kept in mind.” This “face-down surfacing from while keeping in mind” transition results in a very slight attention to, and hence, transitive-like “objectification” of the content of the passing Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing. In other words, that slight attention to the passing content of an Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing is too fleeting to result in a substantively-based object. Instead, that content serves as a transitively-based “object” that allows one to pass on that content for clearer articulation in the coming narrative. Alternatively, the operating I may surface face-down from and attend to the passing content of an Experience of Implicit or Explicit knowing resulting in its complete objectification as a substantive object or Excerpt. Lastly, the operating I may surface face-up from the content of an Experience of Implicit or Explicit knowing, thereby prompting a new, developing Primary Excerptive Experience (memory form) that is somehow related to that content. Face-up reactions consist of not “looking back” on passing thought contents and are therefore more “forward looking.”
It’s interesting to consider “face-down surfacing from while keeping in mind” transitions of attention. As the operating I begins to surface face-down from the conceptualization of an Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing it seems to sweep across some of its content. In this case, the operating I is both immersed in while simultaneously surfacing from the narrative’s conceptual and quasi-perceptual contents. This might be compared to riding in a car and of looking out a side window at the scenery that is swiftly moving past. By doing so, one is seeing the scenery but is barely objectifying any given aspect of it. Similarly, a “face-down while keeping in mind” transition represents a “glance” at a passing narrative, one that is too brief to result in a substantive object, but long enough to allow one to pass on the content of the narrative for a re-articulation in the narrative ahead.
Another intriguing phenomenon that we’ve all observed has to do with the “face-up” transitions of the operating I out of developing Primary Excerptive Experiences. When someone is talking to us, we often observe instances during which her eyes are averting away from us and then focusing on something as if at a distance. In my opinion, this eye averting occurs with regularity while she is speaking because it is a sign that the she is experiencing Primary Excerptive Experiences or mini memories. I believe that, during any given instance of the quick movement of the eyes away from the listener (followed by a fixation of the eyes) the speaker is subjectively experiencing a Primary Excerptive Experience. The movement of the eyes may take one or two tenths of a second, indicative of the duration of the accompanying Primary Excerptive Experience. I also believe that, when the averting of the eyes comes to a fixation point, which co-occurs with the speaker briefly staring into space as if at a specific object, the Primary Excerptive Experience has been attended to, thereby rendering it a static object or Excerpt-image. Following this attentive fixation, the speaker turns her gaze back towards us with new information to share in response to that image (e.g., Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing).
Regarding the latter, if you were to observe someone who is deep in thought, you would see the same eye movements indicative of developing Primary Excerptive Experiences that you witness when watching and listening to a speaker. In other words, the micro dynamics of thinking reflective of inner speech are the same as those of outer speech.
Now we are ready to address the second category of thoughts, Secondary Thoughts. As we consider the reality of Primary Thoughts, one can easily imagine that their Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing are so fast, so vaguely articulated, so foreshortened, or so covertly and minimally expressed that they could easily dissipate without having any cognitive or behavioral impact. Therefore, it often happens that, as the operating I surfaces from either one, it takes it as an object of attention, thereby establishing an Excerpt of it. When it does so, a Secondary Thought has been established. A Secondary Thought is a conceptual reaction in which the operating I is immersed and during which it is responding to the objectified and identified content of an Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing. This conceptualization is often meant to engender a fuller and clearer articulation of the passing Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing. If such an articulation did not occur, the content of those reactions might be forever lost and/or of no impact.
As the operating I surfaces from an Experience of of Implicit Knowing, for example, and takes it as an object of attention, that objectified, Excerpt-image is immediately identified at the outset of what I call the Reflective Conceptual Phase of the conceptualization of a Secondary Thought. This Reflective Conceptual Phase is a narrative reaction, as well, and at its outset and into the middle of its progression, the operating I remains focused on or is remembering the Excerpt’s identified content. As the conceptual reaction progresses, however, the operating I turns away from its remembered object and becomes increasingly immersed in that narrative reaction as it runs its course. I call this portion of the narrative reaction, during which the operating I has turned away from its object, no longer holding onto the memory of the Excerpt’s identity while becoming increasingly immersed in the present conceptualization, the Elaborative Conceptual Phase of Secondary Thought. As the Elaborative Conceptual Phase comes to an end, any one of the different types of transitions of attention can occur.
When the Elaborative Conceptual Phase of the narrative reaction of a Secondary Thought continues, the operating I is essentially “losing sight” of its Excerpt-object to the point of potentially forgetting that its content even existed. It does this forgetting in the service of allowing new associations to be triggered by the narrative content at hand and during which the operating I is increasingly immersed.
The present theory proposes that the operating I transitions out of the different parts of thoughts with a variety of transitions of attention. Each of these transitions involves various degrees of attention to and objectification of specific, passing contents. Frequently, the operating I “moves” out of an Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing via a “face-down surfacing from while keeping in mind” transition, as if it were engaged in a “darting glance” that only lasts long enough to quickly pass on its content for a more complete articulation in the narrative of a Secondary Thought. This glance is not long enough to engender a clearly established substantive object or Excerpt. In addition, because of the lack of a completely objectified Excerpt, that passing content is typically re-worded or translated in slightly different words. In contrast, a face-down surfacing from and attention to that passing Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing’s content allows for a more complete objectification of it and may yield an altogether different narrative in the conceptual reaction of a Secondary Thought than would a “face-down surfacing from while keeping in mind” transition.
In different terms, the narrative responses of Secondary Thoughts tend to be new, conceptually-based associations about the passing contents of Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing when the operating I transitions out of them in a face-down and attention to fashion. Still further, face-up transitions of the operating I out of the passing narratives of Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing often lead to new associative reactions to them, ones that are typically memory forms that are quasi-visually-based (e.g., developing Primary Excerptive Experiences). Therefore, face-up transitions tend to evoke meaningful contents somehow, but less directly related to the contents of their immediate predecessors because face-up reactions don’t look back on (in a face down, attention to fashion) passing thought contents.
Anther interesting distinction is one between reactions and responses to given, passing contents during Primary and Secondary Thoughts. Reactions are associations to some passing thought-based content whereas responses are associations about some passing thought-content. As stated above, “face-down while keeping in mind” transitions tend to result in a simple re-wording or clearer articulation of passing thought contents, and hence, don’t lead to new reactions per se. Face-down while attending to transitions that result in the implicit identification of some passing thought-content tend to result in narrative reactions to that content, whereas face-down attention to transitions that result in explicit identification of passing contents tend to result in narrative responses about that content.
It is important to note that the operating I almost always surfaces from developing Primary Excerptive Experiences in a face-down, attention-to fashion. If it transitioned out of them in any other way, their objectification and identification would not likely occur and they would probably have no impact on subsequent thought or behavior.
At this juncture let’s consider an example of a Secondary Thought that consists of a face-up transition out of its Elaborative Conceptual Phase versus one that consists of a face-down transition out of that phase. Recently, I saw a client’s name on my daily log sheet and a developing Primary Excerptive Experience of the memory of her telling me that she needed me to write a letter for her manifested “in my mind.” When my operating I surfaced face-down from it, it was objectified in the form of an Excerpt-image. Then I implicitly identified it at the outset of an Experience of Implicit Knowing, thereby rendering it an Implicitly Identified Excerpt. The remainder of the Experience of Implicit Knowing consisted of the following (subjectively) vague and fleeting narrative form: “Rebecca needs a letter.” Then my operating I surfaced face-down from while keeping in mind the content of this Experience of Implicit Knowing at the outset of the Reflective Conceptual Phase of a Secondary Thought in the form of the conceptualization, “I need to write that letter for Rebecca.”
As stated above, face-down surfacing from while keeping in mind transitions often function to more fully articulate the narrative in the passing Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing. Next, my operating I turned away from the memory of the identity of the passing reactive knowing as it became increasingly immersed in the Elaborative Conceptual Phase of the Secondary Thought at hand. Then my operating I transitioned out of this elaborative phase in a face-up fashion, leading to the association of a developing Primary Excerptive Experience of my lap top computer having “frozen” late last night, right in the middle of some writing I was doing.
Alternatively, I could have experienced exactly the same Experience of Implicit Knowing referred to in the last paragraph but now, my operating I surfaces from it in a face-down while attending to fashion, resulting in its complete objectification and identification (e.g., “I need to write that letter for Rebecca”). In other words, at the outset of the Reflective Conceptual Phase of a Secondary Thought I attend to and implicitly identify, for example, the latter narrative and through the remainder of this conceptual phase experience the conceptualization, “I’ll do it right now. ” The latter conceptualization is a reaction to the identified content of the passing, objectified and identified narrative, whereas the face-down while keeping in mind transition out of the passing Experience of Implicit Knowing led to a simple translation of it in the conceptualization to follow.
The conceptualizations of Secondary Thoughts that take passing Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing as their objects often serve the functional role of translating or re-wording their contents in order to better articulate or convey their meanings. Such conceptualizations represent a kind of end-point to the progression of meaning that has developed across any given Secondary Thought. Without the conceptualizations of Secondary Thoughts many of the meanings embodied in Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing that are the conceptualizations of Primary thoughts might dissipate so rapidly as to render them impotent. Therefore, Secondary Thoughts lend themselves to trains of thinking that are thematically consistent and that carry cognition forward in ways that Primary Thoughts cannot. Koestler (1975) states, for example, that words serve the purpose of crystallizing or bringing greater articulation and precision to “vague images” and “hazy intuitions.” Such “vague images” might be those of the Excerpt-images we’ve defined here and “hazy intuitions” might be compared to subjectively vague and fleeting Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing. Similarly, the famous social psychologist, Lev Vygostsky (1962), states that external speech is typically explicit, whereas “inner speech” is often abbreviated in a draft-like form used for oneself. He adds that there is an even more inward form of speech that has its own structure, one that is difficult to transform to speech (pp. 148-149). Vygotsky’s comments about inner speech are not unlike my own, but I believe that the present theory adds some clarification to the uniqueness of covert forms of thinking.
It is important to note that Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing, for example, are automatic, associatively-based, narrative reactions that are given to you, so to speak, without effort or deliberation. In contrast, many conceptualizations of Secondary Thoughts, because they tend to be translations or re-wordings of the passing contents of Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing, are built up with a tiny bit of effort. This effortful translating or re-wording is similar to how you might re-word an explanation from one friend to another friend to help the latter better understand what is being stated.
Near the beginning of this blog the operating I was compared to a swimmer remaining stationary while fighting an upstream current. Utilizing some of the other concepts discussed thus far, that swimmer’s head may, at times, surface face-up from its brief immersion in the water during the butterfly stroke and face-down during the free style stroke. Similar to a swimmer, the operating I is immersed in and as the quasi-perceptual contents of the stream of mental events/objects followed by her face-up or face-down surfacing from such contents. Depending on the differences in these transitions, those identified contents can be used as transitively-based “objects” that evoke associative reactions to them or as substantively-based ones that lead to reactions that are more likely to be about those contents. The operating I can become immersed in the perceptual and quasi-perceptual contents at hand, while having no subjective sense of consciousness of self or of one of those contents, followed by its surfacing from that immersion, leading to their objectification, identification, and to different degrees of self- and object-awareness in its reactions to them.
As a fascinating aside, many philosophers of old believed that the objects of thoughts are something called “ideas,” but they struggled to define or capture just what these apparently elusive phenomena are. The present theory may fill a gap in the delineation of these “ideas.” For example, the passing Experience of Implicit knowing can be extremely fleeting, vague, foreshortened, and covertly expressed, so much so, that one may have no memory or awareness of it once it passes. However, if the operating I, at the outset of a conceptualization of a Secondary Thought, objectifies and identifies that reactive knowing, that knowing may serve as the “idea” to which philosophers of old were alluding. Responding to this “idea” via the conceptualizations of Secondary Thoughts may also be responsible for the subjective experience of having a sense of what we think before we think it. In other words, that initial sense of meaning embodied in the Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing are often extremely vague and elusive, but when either one is captured by the operating I that surfaces from its immersion it, rendering it an objectified and identified object, a new narrative reaction to it likely follows, thereby potentially engendering a sense of familiarity. However, if asked, one would likely say that the narrative embodied in the Reflective and Elaborative Conceptual Phases of Secondary Thought is the originator of the idea in it rather than recognizing that its phases are re-representations of the objectified and identified idea to which they are reacting.
Secondary Thoughts are perhaps the most powerful type of thinking. Their basic formula is one in which developing Primary Excerptive Experiences (e.g., developing memories) become the identified objects from which narrative responses in the form of Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing arise, which in turn, become the identified objects for the conceptualizations of Secondary Thoughts that are responses to their passing contents. These conceptualizations of Secondary Thoughts may then serve as situational contexts that give rise to new, developing Primary Excerptive Experiences or to face-down attention to transitions that capture the meaning embodied in these passing conceptualizations. In other words, Secondary Thoughts lend to “trains” of thoughts that follow particular themes in the service of meeting specific goals. They better ensure “staying on track” regarding the pursuit of given themes because they capture the meanings embodied in the often elusive Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing.
Another way to consider Secondary Thoughts is as follows. The operating I first “lives through,” is subjectively immersed in, or embodies a developing Primary Excerptive Experience (developing memory), lives through that memory’s objectification/identification in the form of an Excerpt, and lives through an Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing as a narrative reaction or response to that excerpt-memory. By surfacing face-down from and attending to the Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing, the operating I, in one instant, is privy to the meaning embodied in the Primary Excerptive Experience and to the meaning reflected in either narrative reaction of the Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing. The objectified and identified Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing results in a complex of meaning that evolves through the remainder of the conceptualization of Secondary Thought, often in the form of a narrative response that reflects its significance to the present goals of the self.
The absorption of the operating I in all thought contents begins with developing Primary Excerptive Experiences (for example), continues through their objectification/identification, through Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing, through transitions of attention out of those reactions, and finally terminates via its immersion in the Reflective and Elaborative Conceptual phases of Secondary Thoughts. The operating I seems to “process” the phase-based contents of thoughts by being immersed in and as those contents, followed by surfacing from them via a variety of transitions of attention that often result in different degrees of their objectification and identification. In other words, the phase-based contents of thoughts seem be “processed” “on-line” by the operating I via becoming immersed in/as their transitive forms and by objectifying them and rendering them substantive objects. I hypothesize that the “movements” of the operating I in/as and out of the phase-based contents of thoughts play an influential or determinate role in cognition. Subjectively, it certainly feels as if being part of the flow of the contents of thoughts by way of different degrees of immersion in them and by different degrees of their objectification/identification is necessary and crucial to the functioning and influence of thinking.
Now that Primary and Secondary Thoughts have been delineated in terms of their component “parts” I would like to offer a more general definition of thinking. A thought exists when the operating I attends to, objectifies, and identifies a certain stimulus, followed by a sequence of phases that culminate in a conceptualization, all of which somehow take that object’s identity and significance into account.
In contrast to this general definition of thoughts, there also exist what I refer to as presently occurring cognitions, which are meaningful, behavioral/emotional reactions to attended to, objectified, and identified stimuli, reactions that somehow take those stimuli and their significance into account. In other words, Presently Occurring Cognitions do not possess conceptualizations that take into account the identities of their objects. Instead, they contain meaningful, behavioral and/or emotional reactions that take their identified objects and their significance into account. For instance, as I’m walking I suddenly look down and identify what looks like dog poop just ahead of me and increase the length of my stride to avoid stepping it it. The behavioral reaction of increasing my stride was an automatic, associatively-based response to identifying the stimulus on the side walk and happened in place of what could have been a narrative, conceptual reaction. Instances of Presently Occurring Cognitions take place with great frequency and are so fast that we are typically not conscious of them. They occur with great frequency, for example, while driving a car because that activity often requires quick behavioral reactions. For example, as I’m driving in the right lane on the high way a car to my left starts coming into my lane. Upon identifying the car and its movement into my lane I quickly and automatically react with a fear response and press my foot on the gas pedal to speed ahead in order to avoid being hit.
It’s fascinating to consider the subjective realities of “inner speech” given what has been discussed about Primary and Secondary Thoughts thus far. It’s likely that the covertly expressed Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing during inner speech can be traversed by the operating I very rapidly and via foreshortened and vaguely articulated narrative reactions. With practice, the operating I may learn to “skim” such narratives, perhaps in the service of speed, or perhaps as a form of dysfunction (i.e., ADHD), where such skimming may make the functioning and potential impact of thoughts less influential and effective. Further experience may allow for the operating I to develop its various transitional abilities, including “surfacing from while keeping in mind” transitions from the passing phase-based contents of thinking. In other words, over time and with much experience the operating I may become very skilled and adept in traversing and transitioning from the phase-based contents of thought.
Thus far I have defined two categories of thoughts: Primary and Secondary. There are also two forms of thoughts, called Elaborative and Reflective thoughts. Those thoughts that are narrative reactions to Implicitly Identified Excerpts are called Elaborative Thoughts. Elaborative thoughts take Implicitly Identified Excerpts as their objects, indicating that the attention to those objects is only long enough to result in their detection, consciousness, and implicit identification. I call them “elaborative” because they seem to speed forward in a meaningfully, elaborative fashion without too much attention to their implicitly identified objects. In other words, they are reactions to the implicit identities of their objects rather than tending to be responses that are about those objects.
Reflective thoughts are narrative reactions to Explicitly Identified Excerpts. They do so by attending to those Excerpt-images for a long enough time to render them Conscious and explicit. I call them reflective because the operating I appears to “look backwards” at the Excerpt-image, seemingly slowing the meaningful progression of thought a bit. Alternatively, because of slowing down the progression of thought by attending to a given Excerpt-image for a longer period of time, one “feels as if” one is “looking backwards” as if in reflection.
Both Primary and Secondary thoughts can manifest as Elaborative and Reflective thoughts (and vice-versa). At the outset of Primary Elaborative Thoughts the operating I attends to an Excerpt for such a short duration that it is only detected and implicitly identified at the beginning of an Experience of Implicit Knowing, rendering that object an Implicitly Identified Excerpt. In contrast, at the beginning of Primary Reflective Thoughts the operating I attends to an Excerpt-image for a longer duration at the outset of an Experience of Explicit Knowing, resulting in its explicit identification.
During Secondary Elaborative Thoughts the operating I takes any passing Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing as its object and implicitly identifies it at the outset of the Reflective Conceptual Phase of Secondary Thought.
In turn, during Secondary Reflective Thoughts the operating I takes any Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing as an object and attends to it for a longer duration, thereby engendering its explicit identity and Consiousness at the outset of the Reflective Conceptual Phase of Secondary Thought.
Primary Elaborative Thoughts can also assume different types. For example, when the operating I surfaces face-down from and attends to a developing Primary Excerptive Experience (developing memory), it is objectified and identified at the outset of an Experience of Implicit Knowing. Next, a face-up transition out of this reaction prompts a new and somehow related developing Primary Excerptive Experience, marking the end of a Prototypic Elaborative Thought, in a series of such thoughts. In other words, this type of thinking consists of a conceptualization (Experience of Implicit Knowing) that is a reaction to an excerpted Primary Excerptive Experience (memory) that gives rise to a new Primary Excerptive Experience, leading to a new conceptualization to that attended to and excerpted experience, and so on. This type of thinking may be the most primitive or simplest of all the types delineated by the present theory. Chains of Prototypic Elaborative Thoughts are likely the fastest and most elusive among all of the types of thoughts.
Let’s consider a few successive Prototypic Elaborative Thoughts. I usually perform a number of tasks on Saturday mornings at my place of work. During one such morning I looked at my log of clients from the day before and experienced the developing Primary Excerptive Experience (i.e., developing memory) of having acknowledged to myself on the prior night that I hadn’t finished all of my progress notes. My operating I surfaced face-down from and attended to this developing Primary Excerptive Experience, and in so doing, objectified it into a seemingly static Excerpt-image. I then implicitly identified the Excerpt at the outset of an Experience of Implicit Knowing that consisted of the following narrative: “I need to do those progress notes.” My operating I then transitioned face-up from this reaction, marking the end of the first Prototypic Elaborative Thought. My operating I subsequently became immersed in a developing Primary Excerptive Experience of having noticed that I was out of progress note paper. Next, my operating I surfaced face-down from and attended to this developing memory, thereby objectifying it into an Excerpt-image. I then implicitly identified this image at the outset of an Experience of Implicit Knowing, the remainder of which consisted of the narrative reaction, “I need to check my secretary’s office.” My operating I then transitioned face-up from this reaction, leading to a developing Primary Excerptive Experience of having seen some of those papers on the lower level of the book shelf in her office. My operating I surfaced face-down from and attended to this reaction, resulting in its objectification and implicit identification at the outset of an Experience of Implicit Knowing, the remainder of which consisted of, “I’ll go check the book shelf.” My operating I then transitioned out of this reaction face-up, leading to another developing Primary Excerptive Experience.
The former paragraph mentioned a series of three successive Prototypic Elaborative Thoughts, the entire sequence of which might have lasted two or three seconds. In addition, because they are each so fast, and because each component phase is so fleeting, I will likely have little-to-no memory of any of those phases or of any of those thoughts once they pass. Moreover, in a series of such thoughts, no given one will likely be remembered because, by definition, they don’t take passing instances of themselves as objects. They serve their function and are gone forever, never to be remembered.
As stated above, Reflective Thoughts are one of two major forms of thinking defined by the fact that they either end with a Reaction of Explicit Knowing (e.g., a Primary Reflective Thought) or with a terminal conceptualization that takes a passing Reaction of Implicit or Explicit Knowing as its object (e.g., Secondary Reflective Thought). I call them “reflective” because the operating I attends to its objectified Fixed Image for a slightly longer duration as compared to that which occurs during Elaborative Thoughts. In so doing, the operating I attends to that Fixed Image long enough to explicitly identify and render it Conscious. As a result, that longer attention might be viewed as a reflective moment because one is lingering on its object, in a relative way. The operating I seems to be reflecting on that Fixed Image so to engender a response about it rather than detecting it so fast as to prompt a reaction to it via some elaboration on its implicit identity and significance.
The first type of Reflective Thought to be presented here is called a prototypic reflective thought. In a series of such thoughts, a Prototypic Reflective Thought is initiated by a Developing Micro Experience, followed by a face-down, prolonged attention to the tail end of that micro experience, which seems to transform it into an objectified, Fixed Image. This objectification is followed by the explicit identification of that image at the outset of a Reaction of Explicit Knowing, coupled with a potential narrative response that takes the significance of that image into account relative to the present goals of the self. The Prototypic Reflective Thought ends via a face-up surfacing of the operating I out of that reaction, leading to a new, Developing Micro Experience that will become the object for a new Prototypic Thought.
Chains of Prototypic Elaborative and Reflective thoughts are very fast and live a fleeting existence without ever being noticed by selective attention. In other words, in a series of such thoughts, any one of them is not taken as a passing object itself. As a result of their fleeting existence and due to the fact that, by definition, they don’t take passing instances of themselves as objects, most of us don’t realize that we experience them so frequently and that they represent a huge amount of thinking. We are swept up and immersed in trains of such thoughts until we become distracted by something else, leaving us with no consciousness that they ever occurred.
Reflective Thoughts consist of Junctures of Receptive-Reactive presence, a name that designates the interval during which the operating I surfaces from and attends to a passing, Developing Micro Experience, resulting in its objectification as a Fixed Image. Then, as the outset of a Reaction of Explicit Knowing, the operating I attends to that Fixed Image long enough to explicitly identify its content, and through its remainder, consists of a narrative that reflects the significance of that image to the present goals of the self. During Primary Thoughts the Juncture of Receptive-Reactive Presence ends as soon as the Reaction of Explicit Knowing ends. During Secondary Thoughts the Juncture of Receptive-Reactive Presence ends as soon as the Elaborative Conceptual Phase of thought ends.
It’s fascinating to consider the apparent fact that when the operating I surfaces from, attends to, and then reacts to a Fixed Image at the outset of Reflective Thoughts, becoming increasingly Conscious of that image as it does so, an experience of being a separate identity in relation to that image is engendered. In this regard, the operating I increasingly experiences itself as a receptive-reactive presence (albeit, implicitly) during its attention and response to the content of that Excerpt at the outset of and through the middle of the Experience of Explicit Knowing, for example. It’s as if the operating I is looking at while moving away from that content, resulting in a sense of self-awareness relative to that fixed object.
Importantly, I believe that one’s Consciousness of some passing, explicitly identified phase-based and excerpted content of thought increases the probability that one will remember and/or utilize it in subsequent thought or behavior. This greater probability is both a function of being Conscious of the identity of the present object and of experiencing a greater awareness of self in relation to it. The Consciousness of the object, along with its recognized significance to the increasing sense of self-presence in relation to it, increases the likelihood that it will be utilized in some fashion. More generally, I hypothesize that face-down prolonged attention to transitions out of passing thought contents have an influence on and play a determinate role in the cognitive impact of our thoughts. In turn, the other transitions of attention have a determinate influence, as well, based on the fact that they may not result in the Consciousness and explicit recognition of passing thought contents, but in the consciousness and implicit identification of those contents.
Let’s consider examples of a Secondary Elaborative Thought and a Secondary Reflective Thought to consider their differences. Remember, Secondary Thoughts take passing Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing as their objects. It’s Sunday morning and as I’m watching TV I glance at the clock and notice that it’s 9:32 am. The numbers on the clock become the Excerpt-image that I take as an object, followed by implicitly identifying those numbers as the time of day and by the narrative reaction, “It’s Brownie’s breakfast time.” The latter is an Experience of Implicit Knowing. I then take that passing narrative reaction as an excerpted object and implicitly identify it at the outset of the Reflective Conceptual Phase of a Secondary Elaborative Thought, leading to the narrative reaction, “I’ll get his breakfast now.” This narrative certainly suggests that I’ve taken the identity of the Experience of Implicit Knowing into account, as reflected by my reaction to it. In other words, at the outset of the Reflective Conceptual Phase of Secondary Thought, my operating I attended to the objectified, excerpted Experience of Implicit Knowing for a very brief time (e.g., perhaps one tenth of a second), only long enough to detect it’s identity in an implicit way.
Now let’s change the latter example of a Secondary Elaborative Thought into a Secondary Reflective one. Instead of reacting to the objectified, excerpted Experiencen of Implicit Knowing (“It’s Brownie’s breakfast time”) for an extremely short duration at the outset of a Reflective Conceptual Phase of a Secondary Thought, my operating I attends to it for a bit longer (perhaps for three tenths of a second). As a result of this slightly longer duration of attention, that objectified version of the Experience of Implicit Knowing is rendered Conscious and explicit. In addition, my narrative response to it through the remainder of the Reflective and Elaborative Conceptual Phases of this Secondary Reflective Thought changes: “It’s Brownie’s breakfast time and mine too!” This narrative is different from that of the Secondary Elaborative Thought above because of the longer attention to the passing Experience of Implicit Knowing. In this case, it seems as if that longer attention to the identified Excerpt lent to a further association about it being time for me to eat too.
It’s important to note, however, that the narrative response of the Secondary Reflective Thought above doesn’t have to reflect a further association (though it likely will) or one that is more about its object than the narrative in the Secondary Elaborative Thought. In fact, their narrative reactions could end up being identical. Nevertheless, at the outset of the Secondary Reflective Thought, the identity of its object would be explicit and Consciously available to the operating I instead of implicit and consciously available.
Secondary Elaborative Thoughts reflect one of two different transitions of attention out of the Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing, which become their objects. The operating I can transition out of an Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing via a face-down while keeping in mind transition or a face-down attention to transition that results in the implicit identification of that experience of knowing’s content. When a face-down keeping in mind transition occurs, the passing Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing is attended to so slightly as to not be rendered a substantive object. Instead, that attention is so brief that it only allows one the opportunity to implicitly identify its content and to pass it on for clearer articulation in the narrative of the Secondary Elaborative Thought at hand. The Secondary Elaborative Thought that consists of a face-down while keeping in mind transition relative to the passing Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing is called version one of secondary elaborative thoughts. In contrast, a face-down attention to transition relative to a passing Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing allows for a full objectification and implicit identification of the their content, lending to a fuller range of narrative responses to it, which is equivalent to what I call version two of secondary elaborative thoughts.
When the operating I transitions out of a passing Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing in a face down attention to fashion, a prolonged focus on it renders its content Conscious and its identity explicit, resulting in a Secondary Reflective Thought. For example, if the operating I transitions out of the Experience of Implicit Knowing above (“It’s Brownie’s breakfast time”) in a face down prolonged attention to fashion, rendering an explicit identification and Consciousness of that experience of knowing, the conceptualization unfolding relative to it might have been, “I hope there’s enough food left for him.” This conceptualization might be explained by the possibility that, when the operating I focused on the identity of the Experience of Implicit Knowing (“It’s Brownie’s breakfast time”), that focus was long enough to render it Conscious and to evoke new, relevant associations relative to it. In this case, the word, “breakfast,” might have evoked a faint image of his bag of dog-food from yesterday, one which had very little food in it. This faint image may have played a role in the, “I hope there’s enough food left for him.”
Therefore, during Secondary Thoughts, transitions of attention out of the Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing have an influence on the content of the narrative reactions that take them as objects. However, we cannot predict the content of those reactions based on knowing the type of transition of attention that occurs. In general, face-down while keeping in mind transitions out of passing Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing lend themselves to a simple re-wording of their contents in the conceptualizations of Secondary Elaborative Thoughts. Face-down attention to transitions out of the passing Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing lend themselves to new, associatively-based responses about those reactions.
Face-up transitions often occur following the Conceptualizations of Primary and Secondary Thoughts. These transitions do not result in keeping in mind the narrative contents of those reactions and do not “transform” those contents into substantive objects. However, face-up transitions typically utilize the contents of passing narratives as transitively-based “objects” from which new, meaningfully-based associations related to those contents will appear in one’s subjective experience. In other words, the content of a passing narrative serves as a spring-board, so to speak, from which one is jumping from that content in a face-up or face-forward fashion, most often leading to a new, developing Primary Exceptive Experience.
Let’s do a summary of the discussion thus far. The fixed and identified images of thoughts can be of stimuli in the surroundings, of developing Primary Excerptive Experiences prompted by the surroundings or by passing conceptualizations, and of aspects of just passing conceptualizations(i.e., faint images associated with those conceptualizations) The operating I’s attention to any Excerpt can be short (e.g., at the outset of Experiences of Implicit Knowing) or longer (e.g., at the outset of Experiences of Explicit Knowing). Primary Thoughts are defined by Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing. Secondary Thoughts are defined by narrative reactions that take passing Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing as their fixed objects. In addition, the Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing can be completely and clearly articulated, incompletely and vaguely articulated, and/or foreshortened. The narratives of Secondary Thoughts can take the same varied forms of articulation, as well. All of the narrative reactions of Primary or Secondary Thoughts can be covertly (i.e., inner speech) or overtly expressed, but the Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing of Primary Thoughts often take covert forms. Lastly, the movements of the operating I in, as, and out of the different parts of thought vary from face-up to face-down transitions out of any one, from different degrees of immersion in any given part, and from different degrees of objectification (and hence, identification) of the contents of given, passing phases. All of the variations noted regarding thoughts engender different subjective qualities and contents within and between thoughts.
One function of thoughts is to take, as objects, the identity of the passing conceptualizations of thoughts. In this way, we can know and react to what we are thinking. The simplest type of thought that takes a passing conceptualization as its identified object is called, Implicit Identification. Implicit Identification exists in the primary category of thought and is a form of Elaborative Thought. It takes the conceptualization of a passing thought as its object and implicitly identifies and reacts to it via a conceptualization. In contrast to Implicit Identification, Explicit Identification, in its primary category and reflective forms, takes a passing conceptualization as its object, explicitly identifying and conceptually reacting to it.
The following are examples of the primary categorical forms of Implicit and Explicit Identification. A passing Primary Thought ends with the conceptualization, “I’m going to work out at the gym this morning.” At the outset of an instance of Implicit Identification, primary category, my operating I takes that passing conceptualization as an object and implicitly identifies its content at the outset of an Experience of Implicit Knowing. Through the remainder of the reaction I experience the narrative, “I’ll go put on my gym clothes.” The fact that I implicitly identified the passing conceptualization is suggested in the latter narrative of planning to put on my gym clothes. In contrast, I could take the passing conceptualization as an object and explicitly identify it at the outset of an Experience of Explicit Knowing during an instance of Explicit Identification, primary category. Through the remainder of the Experience of Explicit Knowing I experience the narrative, “I think my gym pants need to be cleaned.” This narrative reaction doesn’t prove that my operating I explicitly identified the passing conceptualization or was Conscious of it. Only my subjective experience reflects the reality of that explicitness and Consciousness. Nevertheless, in this instance, that narrative regarding a recognition that my gym pants need to be cleaned came about as an additional associative reaction that was likely a function of the operating I’s prolonged attention to the passing conceptualization.
Implicit identification and Explicit Identification also have secondary categorical forms, meaning that they take the Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing of Primary Thoughts as their identified objects, with the exception of the narrative Experiences of Implicit and Explicit Knowing that occur during Prototypic Elaborative or Prototypic Reflective Thoughts. Remember that Prototypic Elaborative and Reflective Thoughts end with developing Primary Excerptive Experiences that are prompted by just passing Experiences of Implicit or Explicit Knowing. In contrast, secondary instances of Implicit and Explicit Identification take the passing conceptualizations of Primary Thoughts as their identified objects and not developing Primary Excerptive Experiences.
My operating I could take the passing Experience of Explicit Knowing (“I think my gym pants need to be cleaned”) as an object at the outset of an instance of Implicit Identification, secondary category. In other words, at the outset of the Reflective Conceptual Phase of the secondary category of Implicit Identification, that Experience of Explicit Knowing is objectified and implicitly identified. Through the remainder of this phase and the subsequent Elaborative Conceptual Phase, I experience the narrative reaction, “Lori just put some clean ones in my dresser drawer.” In contrast, if my operating I took the passing narrative, “I think my gym pants need to be cleaned,” at the outset of an instance of Explicit Identification, secondary category, its content is explicitly identified and Conscious, lending to the narrative response through the Reflective and Elaborative Conceptual Phases, “I’ll put the clean ones on now.” In the latter conceptualization, I decide to go put the clean pants on, one step further along than the narrative reaction, “Lori just put some clean ones in my dresser drawer.” The latter was likely one step further along due to the prolonged attention to the passing and objectified, “I think my pants need to be cleaned.”
Implicit Identification, secondary category has two versions, based on how the operating I transitions out of an Experience of Implicit or Explicit Knowing of a Primary Thought. If it transitions via a face down while keeping in mind fashion, it is version one. If it transitions via a face down attention to fashion it is version two. For example, a passing Experience of Implicit Knowing of a Primary Thought (e.g., “I’m so thirsty”) is taken as an object at the outset of a instance of Implicit Identification, secondary category. My operating I “moves” out of that passing Experience of Implicit Knowing via a face-down while keeping in mind transition, resulting in the narrative, “I really need something to drink.” That face-down keeping in mind transition led to a mere re-wording or translation of the passing Experience of Implicit Knowing. In contrast, a face-down attention to transition out of the passing Experience of Implicit knowing (“I’m so thirsty”) at the outset of an instance of Implicit Identification, secondary category, version two, could have led to the narrative reaction, “There’s some cold water in the fridge.” The latter narrative reflects the fact that I took the implicit identity of the passing Experience of Implicit Knowing into account in my reaction to it.
Like Implicit Identification, Explicit Identification can manifest as Primary or Secondary thoughts. In its secondary categorical form it takes an Experience of Implicit Knowing or Explicit Knowing as its object, but in so doing, it attends to that identified object for a prolonged period as compared to either version of Implicit Identification, secondary category. For example, the operating I transitions out of a Experience of Explicit Knowing that consists of the narrative reaction, “Man, this razor blade is dull.” That reaction was to the identified Excerpt (i.e., a kinesthetic experience) that my razor seems dull. The operating I transitions out of that Experience of Explicit Knowing in a face-down prolonged attention to fashion, rendering it an objectified and explicitly identified Excerpt that is Conscious. At the outset of the Reflective Conceptual Phase of a Secondary Thought that is responding to that Explicitly Identified Excerpt I experience the narrative reaction, “I wonder if there are some new blades under the sink.” In contrast, if the Secondary Thought was an instance of version two of the second category of Implicit Identification, the operating I would be transitioning in a face-down attention to fashion, but with a shorter duration of attention to that passing Experience of Explicit Knowing (e.g., I need a new razor blade). As a result of that shorter duration of attention, that Excerpt is only rendered conscious and is implicitly identified, leading to the narrative response, “It’s really hurting my face!”
Keep in mind that the main point of giving examples of differing narrative reactions to identified Excerpts is that they differ as a function of the variety of transitions of attention out of their objects. Again, we cannot predict how those narrative reactions will be different, though some generalizations can be made about them. As stated above, face-up transitions often lead to new developing Primary Excerptive Experiences or memory forms. Face-down attention to transitions of a short duration often evoke reactions to passing identified contents whereas face-down prolonged attention to reactions often evoke reactions that are more directly about those contents.
Now, I will define two different types of Reflective Thoughts that are identical in structure to Explicit Identification, primary and secondary categories. The first of these is called Noncomparative Reflective Thinking. Like Implicit and Explicit Identification, Noncomparative Reflective Thinking takes a passing conceptualization as its identified object. In its primary categorical form, Noncomparative Reflective Thinking, like Explicit Identification (primary category), takes a passing conceptualization as its explicitly identified object. However, rather than simply identifying its content (i.e., what it’s about), the operating I transitioning out of it is also becoming conscious of the (passing) presence of the thought itself, and in so doing, takes it as an instance of self (e.g., “That’s me!”). In other words, the Experience of Explicit Knowing, in response to the explicitly identified, passing conceptualization, embodies the belief that the passing thought-object is a present instance of self.
In its secondary categorical form, the operating I transitions out of the Experience of Explicit Knowing of the primary categorical form of Noncomparative Reflective Thinking in a face-down prolonged attention to fashion, thereby rendering that reaction Conscious and explicitly identified. The narrative response at the outset of the Reflective Conceptual Phase of the secondary categorical instance of Noncomparative Reflective Thinking might be one of, “I’m aware of myself (in that objectified thought).” In other words, one’s experience of self-awareness, as engendered by construing the objectified and identified passing conceptualization as an instance of self, becomes even more explicit and Conscious at the outset of the Reflective Conceptual Phase of the narrative of the secondary categorical instance of Noncomparative Reflective Thought.
The second type of Reflective Thinking that is identical in structure to Explicit Identification and Noncomparative Reflective Thinking is called Comparative Reflective Thinking. Like Noncomparative Reflective Thinking, Comparative Reflective Thinking creates an experience of self-awareness during its primary and secondary categorical instances. In contrast to Noncomparative Reflective Thinking, at the outset of Comparative Reflective Thinking, while the operating I is transitioning out of a passing conceptualization in a face-down prolonged attention to fashion, it is becoming tacitly aware of itself, as a subjective presence, separating from that thought-object. In addition, the operating I is not identifying the thought-object as an instance of self. Instead, it is experientially recognizing that the “self” separating from it is the truest instance of subjectivity. In other words, the operating I is having an experience of self-awareness in the form of a subjective sense of presence relative to an objectified passing thought. That subjective sense of presence is at least partly engendered via the seeming experience of an attentive entity that is separating from while looking at the increasingly objectified passing conceptualization. More specifically, as the operating I transitions via a face-down prolonged attention to an Excerpt of the passing conceptualization at the outset of an Experience of Explicit Knowing (during a primary categorical instance of Comparative Reflective Thinking), it is experiencing a sense of self-awareness in the form of an observing entity in relation to it. That Excerpt of the passing conceptualization is construed as not-self because it is recognized as an object. As a result, the narrative of the Experience of Explicit Knowing is something akin to, “This is me, not that.” In its secondary categorical form, the operating I transitions out of that Experience of Explicit Knowing in a face-down prolonged attention to fashion, thereby objectifying and explicitly identifying it at the outset of the Reflective Conceptual Phase of the narrative response at hand. That narrative would consist of something like, “I’m the observer, the true self relative to that thought-object.”
Let’s consider Comparative Reflective Thinking a bit more. During instances of Comparative Reflective Thinking one discovers that there is an observing self that is one’s true subjectivity as opposed to the thought-object at hand. With experience, one realizes that this observing self owns the present or is always more immediate than the thought-object being observed. This realization is repeatedly confirmed when one discovers that the observing self can never be successfully captured or objectified. In other words, the operating I tries to capture a present instance of itself by objectifying what instantly becomes a passing version of itself in the form of a passing conceptualization. Therefore, it becomes increasingly clear that the just captured present instant of self keeps escaping because, in the very next moment, the operating I is objectifying yet one more instance of so-called subjectivity in the form of a passing conceptualization. One realizes that the subjective present can never be successfully captured in an objectified form because it is always stands in contrast to any given object. These repeated failures to capture the subjective present bring one ever closer to one’s true nature as the ever present subject during instances of Comparative Reflective Thinking.
It’s fascinating to consider the apparent continuum of greater degrees of consciousness and explicitness of passing phase-based thought-contents from which the operating I transitions. When the operating I surfaces face-up from a passing phase-based content, that content dissipates without being rendered a “clear” object and often evokes a new developing Primary Excerptive Experience somehow related to it. As a result, face-up transitions from passing thought-contents reflect no detection, consciousness, or Consciousness of those contents from which the operating I is surfacing. In addition, those passing contents are not implicitly or explicitly identified.
When the operating I transitions from a given thought content in a face-down while keeping in mind fashion, that content is not clearly objectified and therefore is barely rendered conscious or detected. In addition, it is not implicitly or explicitly identified. Instead, it serves as a transitively-based “object” that only allows enough detection or consciousness for the operating I to pass on its content for the following phase to further represent.
When the operating I surfaces face-down from and attends to a passing thought content for a short duration, that content is objectified, implicitly identified, and rendered conscious and detected; though it is not frequently remembered once the present thought is over. In addition, that detection frequently allows for a narratively-based associative reaction to it, one that reflects its significance to the self’s goals. Lastly, when the operating I surfaces face-down from and attends to the passing thought content for a longer duration, that content is objectified, explicitly identified, and is rendered Conscious. This too allows for a narratively-based associative response that is often about its content and that is relavant to the present goals of the self.
Similar to the continuum of greater consciousness and explicitness of passing thought contents that different transitions of attention afford is the continuum of greater consciousness and explicitness of Excerpts that serve as the objects of thoughts across the different types of thoughts. For example, Prototypic Elaborative Thoughts are narrative reactions to objectified, developing Primary Excerptive Experiences (memory forms), reactions that the operating I transitions out of in a face-up fashion, thereby evoking new developing Primary Excerptive Experiences as associatively-based reactions. Because the attention to those objectified experiences is so short, their identified contents are only detected and implicitly identified, unlikely to be remembered after they pass. Prototypic Reflective Thoughts attend to their objectified developing Primary Excerptive Experiences for a slightly longer duration than their elaborative counterparts, thereby engendering more Consciousness and explicit identification of their contents. However, because chains of Prototypic Elaborative and Reflective Thoughts typically end by evoking new developing Primary Excerptive Experiences, the Excerpts that served as their initial objects are rarely remembered.
Similarly, Implicit Identification takes the Excerpt-images of passing conceptualizations as their identified objects, leaving them detected, conscious, and implicitly identified at their outset. Therefore, it is unlikely that the identity of any Excerpt will be remembered once the present instance of Implicit Identification ends because any given one hasn’t been attended to long enough. Explicit Identification takes the Excerpts of passing conceptualizations as their identified objects, rendering them detected, Conscious, and explicitly identified at their outset. As a result, it is more likely that the identity of any Excerpt will be remembered once the present instance of Explicit Identification ends. However, any given instance of Implicit or Explicit Identification likely contains an associatively-based narrative reaction to a given Excerpt, one that may steer attention away from the identity of the Excerpt, thereby decreasing the likelihood that it will be remembered. Furthermore, if primary categorical instances of Implicit and Explicit identification are taken as objects of secondary categorical thoughts. the identities of their Excerpts are further elaborated upon, increasing the likelihood of memory for their contents.
Taking the continuum of consciousness and explicitness further, during Noncomparative Reflective Thinking, the operating I is taking a passing conceptualization as its object while transitioning out of it in a face-down prolonged attention to fashion. This prolonged attention is likely a bit longer than that which occurs during instances of Explicit Identification, for example, because one is not only attending to the content of the objectified passing conceptualization, one is also attending to the presence of the thought per se. That longer attention appears to allow for a greater awareness of the passing thought as a presence itself and as a construed instance of self, thereby increasing the Consciousness and explicitness of its content. Furthermore, this awareness of self as experienced in the thought-object becomes more intense, Conscious, and explicit if a secondary categorical instance of Noncomparative Reflective Thinking takes a passing primary instance of Noncomparative Reflective Thinking as its object. Just like Noncomparative Reflective Thinking, Comparative Reflective Thinking renders the same degree of Consciousness and explicitness of the content of the objectified passing conceptualization, content that is further elaborated upon and therefore more likely to be remembered following its secondary categorical form.
There’s a very important functional reality that transitions of attention play when they result in a prolonged focus on an Excerpt at the outset of the Experiences of Explicit Knowing of Primary Thoughts and the Reflective Conceptual Phases of Secondary Thoughts. As stated above, the prolonged attention to Excerpts renders their identities explicit in relation to an intensified sense of receptive-reactive presence during the Juncture of Receptive-Reactive Presence. I believe that this heightened sense of self-presence in relation to an explicitly identified object makes it more likely that one will remember and/or utilize the content of the narrative unfolding in relation to that object. I believe this, in part, because one is not only more Conscious of the identity of the object but is also more self-aware, albeit in a tacit sense. In other words, the content of the narrative unfolding in relation to the explicitly identified object is often directly related to its relevance to the self’s needs/goals, a self that feels a sense of heightened presence in relation to that object’s relevance to its needs/goals. As a result, I believe that the likelihood of that object’s relevance and utilization is increased under these aforementioned conditions.
Regarding the latter, I hypothesize that the instant one objectifies and identifies an object, that moment serves as a start point in time and is a temporal reference point from which the operating I separates. In other words, for example, the operating I is completely immersed in a developing Primary Excerptive Experience from which it surfaces and attends to, face-down. The moment it does so, some quasi-visual aspect of that Primary Excerptive Experience becomes an Excerpt in one’s mind’s eye that the operating I seems to subsequently separate from in time. Through that seeming experience of separation, it becomes increasingly, but tacitly aware of itself as an entity that is other to that object. This heightened sense of self presence in relation to the identified object occurs at the outset of the Experience of Explicit Knowing of Primary Thoughts and Reflective Conceptual Phases of Secondary Thoughts, all of which are typically in the form of narratives. Again, these narratives reflect the significance of the Explicitly Identified Excerpt-image to the goals and needs of the heightened sense of self being engendered in relation to it.
At this juncture, a summary of the objects of the different types of thoughts is in order. As types, we first defined Prototypic Elaborative and Reflective thoughts. Prototypic Thoughts take developing Primary Excerptive Experiences (quasi-perceptually-based and transitively-based memory forms) as passing objects. At the outset of Prototypic Elaborative Thoughts the operating I attends to that objectified and hence excerpted Primary Excerptive Experience for a very short duration (e.g., one or two tenths of a second). At the outset of Prototypic Reflective Thoughts the operating I attends to its object for a bit longer, perhaps three tenths of a second or so. The operating I identifies and typically reacts to those objects or Excerpts via narratively-based associations that then give rise to face-up transitions which evoke new developing Primary Excerptive Experiences. In chains, Prototypic Thoughts are reactions to objectified, passing, developing Primary Excerptive Experiences (personal memories) that lead to narrative reactions which give rise to new ones. Prototypic Thoughts often yield a relatively loose and free-wheeling type of thinking, perhaps equivalent to our common experiences of internal reverie. I believe that they make up the bulk of “inner speech.” Co-occurring with these thoughts are many fleeting visual images that are prompted by the nouns and verbs of our narratives and quasi-perceptual, developing Primary Excerptive Experiences (typically visual in nature).
Implicit and Explicit Identification are two types of thoughts that take passing narrative reactions of other thoughts as their objects. In other words, Implicit and Explicit Identification are narrative reactions to passing narrative reactions. Implicit Identification consists of narrative reactions to the implicitly identified narratives of passing thoughts whereas Explicit Identification consists of narrative reactions to the explicitly identified narratives of passing thoughts. These two types of thoughts ensure that the meaningful significance of the narrative reactions of their predecessor’s are somehow represented in them and taken into account. In their secondary categories, their objects continue to be passing narratives.
Noncomparative and Comparative Reflective Thoughts also take passing narratives as objects, but reflect a greater awareness of their presence as thoughts per se, albeit in different subjective forms. These types of thoughts also have secondary categorical forms. They are responsible for experiences of self-awareness created by the interplay between the operating I and the narratives from which it surfaces.
Another type of thought is called Identification of Excerpts. This type of thought takes developing Primary Excerptive Experiences as its objects. Developing Primary Excerptive Experiences can be evoked by passing conceptualizations “in one’s mind,” by stimulus-cues in the surroundings, and by questions posed by one’s self or by others. These Primary Excerptive Experiences serve as personal memories that “play out” in one’s “mind” and that the operating I attends to, objectifies, and reacts to with narratively-based associations. In a sense, Prototypic Elaborative and Reflective thoughts are a sub-type of Identification of Excerpts because they take as objects the Primary Excerptive Experiences being prompted by passing narrative reactions. I distinguish them because chains of Prototypic Elaborative and Reflective thoughts are generally responsible for what we experience as “inner speech” whereas Identification of Excerpts are narrative reactions to those personal memories that are prompted by passing narratives, by stimuli in the surroundings, and by questions posed to one’s self or by others. Identification of Primary Excerptive Experiences doesn’t have a secondary categorical form because Secondary Thoughts, by definition, specifically take passing conceptualizations as their objects. Identification of Excerpts specifically takes Primary Excerptive Experiences is its objects. Nevertheless, the narrative reactions of Identification of Excerpts can serve as the primary content for other Secondary Thoughts like Implicit and Explicit Identification.
Here’s an example of Identification of Excerpts, elaborative form. I look at the kitchen table and see some bills on the table still in their envelopes. Suddenly, a developing Primary Excerptive Experience occurs, one where I remember being frustrated with myself at my office when I realized I had been late on a credit card payment. When my operating I surfaced face-down from the tail-end of this experience, thereby transforming it into an objectified Excerpt, it was identified at the outset of an Experience of Implicit Knowing and through the remainder of this knowing I experienced the following narrative: “I’m going to pay those today.”
An example of a reflective form of Identification of Excerpts is as follows. One day my girl-friend and I were watching TV when she asked of a certain actress, “What movie was she in? She looks familiar.” I couldn’t remember right away, but I knew I recognized her and was waiting for an answer. Then all of a sudden I became aware of a passing Primary Excerptive Experience of the actress in a snippet of the movie in which I’d seen her. Upon surfacing face-down from and objectifying/excerpting that passing excerptive experience, I identified it at the outset of an Experience of Explicit Knowing, the narrative remainder of which was, “We saw her in Prometheus.” Remember, even though my identification of the objectified Primary Excerptive Experience (Excerpt) was explicit and Conscious, that explicitness need not be clearly represented in the narrative to follow.
Identification of Excerpts is frequently initiated by an introspectively blank period when one poses a question to one’s self or when one is asked a question in some other way, such as while reading, listening to the radio, and so on. We’re all aware of this phenomenon. Someone asks us a question and sometimes the answer isn’t forthcoming; so we wait a bit, believing it may “come to” us. I call this introspectively blank period, one that includes an element of expectant and hopeful waiting for an answer to come, an Excerpt Searching Reaction. In other words, many of the answers that come in response to questions are in the form of developing Primary Excerptive Experiences taking the form of quasi-perceptual imagery that progress over a very short duration. These micro experiences are often initiated by an Exerpt Searching Reaction.
The last type of thought to be defined takes Excerpts of stimuli in the surroundings as its objects. In other words, rather than take passing conceptualizations or developing Primary Excerptive Experiences as its objects, it takes fixed aspects of the surroundings as its objects. This type of thought is called Identification of Stimuli in the Surroundings and it takes elaborative and reflective forms. When one fixes on a stimulus in the surroundings, there is a brief duration (perhaps or two tenths of a second) during which one is subjectively immersed in the perceptual experience of it. Like the operating I’s brief immersion in the contents of the passing phases of thoughts, it is briefly immersed in an/as the perceptual contents in the surroundings just prior to surfacing from, objectifying, and identifying them. Their identification begins at the outset of an Experience of Implicit or Explicit knowing. In other words, if the operating I surfaces from its immersion in a sensory-perceptual content and focuses on it only long enough to render it conscious and implicitly identified, it is an instance of Identification of Stimuli in the Surroundings, elaborative form. If it focuses on it long enough to render it Conscious and explicit it is assuming its reflective form.
Here’s an example of Identification of Stimuli in the Surroundings, elaborative form. One day when driving I noticed a smell. Introspective observation reveals that I was briefly immersed in the experience of the smell even prior to objectifying and identifying it. Upon that objectification, at the outset of an Experience of Implicit Knowing, I quickly identified it as the smell of tar and through its remainder, experienced the narrative reaction, “Whew, that stinks!” An example of its reflective form occurred more recently when I was sitting with my girl-friend and noticed a noxious smell (e.g., objectified it), followed by identifying it at the outset of an Experience of Explicit Knowing and responding to it via the narrative reaction, “Oh my God, Brownie just let go of the worst fart!
Like Identification of Excerpts, Identification of Stimuli in the Surroundings does not have a secondary categorical form because Secondary Thoughts only take passing narratives as their objects, whereas Identification of Stimuli in the Surroundings takes stimuli in the environment as its objects. However, like Identification of Excerpts, the narrative reaction of Identification of Stimuli in the Surroundings can become the object of a Secondary Thought.
Having defined the last type of thought, our goal has been accomplished. Below is a table that summarizes the types of thoughts, their categories, and forms.
That’s the bare bones of the theory of the micro dynamics of thought. There’s much more to be said in the book, “A Theory of the Microdynamics of Occurrent Thought,” especially about many related theoretical issues concerning a number of debates in various academic disciplines regarding the thinking. In addition, there are numerous chapters regarding various lines of research that support elements of the theory. Lastly, there is much said about other theoretical and scientific underpinnings of thinking related to the brain and cognition. Perhaps the present summary of the theory of thinking has interested the reader enough to check out the book.
The Different Types of Thoughts
Primary Thoughts/Elaborative Form
Prototypic Elaborative Thought
Implicit Identification
Identification of Excerpts
Identification of Stimuli in the Surroundings
Secondary Thoughts/Elaborative Form
Implicit Identification(1)
Implicit Identification(2)
Primary Thoughts/Reflective Form
Prototypic Reflective Thought
Explicit Identification
Noncomparative Reflective Thought
Comparative Reflective Thought
Identification of Excerpts
Identification of Stimuli in the Surroundings
Secondary Thoughts/Reflective Form
Explicit Identification
Noncomparative Reflective Thinking
Comparative Reflective Thinking
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